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Haig’s	‘strange	inversion	of	reasoning’∗	
	Daniel	C.	Dennett	Tufts	University		Abstract		David	Haig	(this	issue)	propounds	and	illustrates	the	unity	of	a	radically	revised	set	of	definitions	of	the	family	of	terms	at	the	heart	of	philosophy	of	cognitive	science	and	mind:	information,	meaning,	interpretation,	text,	choice,	possibility,	cause.		This	biological	re-grounding	of	much-debated	concepts	yields	a	bounty	of	insights	into	the	nature	of	meaning	and	life.		
1.	The	View	From	The	Top	Down	
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	One	of	the	most	vehement	19th	century	critics	of	Origin	of	Species,	William	MacKenzie	Beverley	(1868),	summed	up	Darwin’s	contribution	brilliantly:		 In	the	theory	with	which	we	have	to	deal,	Absolute	Ignorance	is	the	artificer;	so	that	we	may	enunciate	as	the	fundamental	principle	of	the	whole	system,	that,	IN	ORDER	TO	MAKE	A	PERFECT	AND	BEAUTIFUL	MACHINE,	IT	IS	NOT	REQUISITE	TO	KNOW	HOW	TO	MAKE	IT.	This	proposition	will	be	found,	on	careful	examination,	to	express,	in	condensed	form,	the	essential	purport	of	the	Theory,	and	to	express	in	a	few	words	all	Mr.	Darwin's	meaning;	who,	by	a	strange	inversion	of	reasoning	[my	emphasis],	seems	to	think	Absolute	Ignorance	fully	qualified	to	take	the	place	of	Absolute	Wisdom	in	all	the	achievements	of	creative	skill.																																																					 	I	have	adapted	Beverley’s	all-caps	howl	to	describe	what	I	call	Turing’s	strange	inversion	of	reasoning	(Dennett,	2013a):		
IN ORDER TO BE A PERFECT AND BEAUTIFUL COMPUTING MACHINE IT IS NOT 
REQUISITE TO KNOW WHAT ARITHMETIC IS.  
Both	Darwin	and	Turing	turned	our	everyday	mind-first	perspective	upside	down,		shocking	many	who	just	could	not—at	first—countenance	their	joint	message:	there	can	be	competence	without	comprehension	(Dennett,	2017).		I	assume	that	the	readers	of	Mind	and	Language	have	already	made	their	peace	with	these	newish		
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perspectives	(though	some	thoughtful	people	still	ardently	resist	them);		I	want	to	introduce	them	to	yet	another	unsettling	inversion,	which	may	be	harder	to	take—at	first.							 The	title	of	this	journal,	Mind	and	Language,	seems	straightforward	enough,	but	it	exemplifies	a	tacit	bias	that	has	gone	largely	unchallenged	for	more	than	fifty	years.	We	might	express	it	thus:			When	it	comes	to	Meaning,	the	best	starting	place	is	(obviously)	Language,	and	the	way	Minds	use	language.			Whether	meaning	resides	first	and	foremost	in	Minds	(e.g.,	the	‘original	intentionality’	of	Searle	(1980))	or	in	linguistic	structures	(e.g.,	a	natural	language	or	the	Language	of	Thought	championed	by	Fodor,	1975),	investigations	into	semantics—and	information,	interpretation,	belief	and	knowledge—should	begin	by	exploiting	what	we	have	already	learned	about	human	minds	and	human	language.	Why?	Because	when	we	examine	the	ways	meanings	are	composed	in	our	own	minds	and	in	our	languages	we	get	to	see	some	of	the	inner	workings	of	a	machine	(an	organ,	a		system,	a	phenomenon,	.	.	.	.)	that	captures,	modulates	and	transmits	meaning.	We	get	to	catalogue	the	meaningful	parts	out	of	which	larger	meanings	are	composed	in	these	systems	(which	might	just	be	a	single	system	with	different	manifestations),	and	this	must	surely	(ding!)1	give	us	insight	into	all	other	systems	in	which	meanings	get	extracted,	modulated,	composed	and	transmitted.		
																																																								1	The	‘surely’	alarm	was	introduced	in	Dennett	(1994)	and	elaborated	in	Dennett	2013,	pp53-4.		Readers	are	encouraged	to	inculcate	the	habit	of	hearing	a	bell	ring	in	
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		This	is	the	consensual	justification	for	setting	up	our	base	camp	in	Mind	and	Language,	a	secure	and	literal	arena	of	meanings	from	which	to	venture	into	more	exotic	and	perhaps	merely	metaphorically	meaning-ful	phenomena,	such	as	the	behavior	of	other	animals,	or	plants,	or	robots,	or	life	itself.		Mind	and	Language	is	a	journal	of	philosophy	and	linguistics	(primarily),	and	certainly	not	a	journal	of	theoretical	biology.		If	there	is	meaning	in	DNA,	for	instance,	then	DNA	must	be	rather	like	a	written	language,	with	readers	and	writers,	a	productive	(syntactical)	system	with	something	like	terms	that	have	something	like	semantics,	but	of	course	the	genetic	system	is	not	just	like	a	(human)	language;	it’s	a	sorta	language,2	a	language	thanks	to	poetic	license	or	metaphor.			 This	familiar—indeed	normal—assumption	shares	with	the	pre-Darwinian	and	pre-Turingian	worldview	the	property	of	taking	comprehension	for	granted:	if	you	are	talking	about	meaning	and	communication,	you	are	talking	about	comprehending	agents,	human	adults,	paradigmatically.	This	may	seem	to	be	an	obvious	starting	point,	but	it	is	an	unheralded	partisan	in	the	embattled	gulf	often	proclaimed	(and	often	deplored)	between	the	Naturwissenschaften	and	the	
Geisteswissenshaften,	or	between	C.	P.	Snow’s	Two	Cultures.	Among	its	ideological	buttresses	are	Brentano’s	thesis	of	the	Irreducibility	of	the	Intentional,	which	obliged	Quine	(1960)	to	take	sides,	at	least	temporarily,	against	the	Intentional																																																																																																																																																																						their	heads	whenever	they	encounter	the	word	‘surely’—since	it	often	marks	the	weakest	point	in	the	argument.			2	I	deliberately	use	the	‘sorta	operator’	I	defined	and	defended	in	Dennett	(2013)	to	implicate	myself	in	this	bias,	which	I	am	now	attempting	to	expose.		The	sorta	operator	is	a	valuable	tool	in	any	naturalist’s	kit,	but	like	all	powerful	tools,	it	can	be	used	in	ways	that	are	not	constructive.		
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realm,	and	Chomsky’s	(1959)	fabled	demolition	of	Skinner’s	Verbal	Behavior	(1957).		Behaviorism,	both	Quine’s	and	Skinner’s	if	not	Ryle’s	or	Wittgenstein’s,	has	been	banished	(Hurrah!)	to	make	the	world	safe	for	Cognitive	Science,	the	properly	scientific	study	of	Mind	and	Language.			What	this	now	canonical	presumption	ignores	is	a	different	sort	of	behaviorism,	more	fundamental	and	less	tinged	with	over-ambitious	ideology:	the	behaviorism	of	science.	Meteorology	is	behavioristic	in	this	sense,	and	so	is	chemistry,	and	physics	and	geology	and	astronomy.	When	you	achieve	a	theory	that	explains	all	meteorological	behavior,	you	get	to	declare	victory;	you’ve	finished	the	task,	because	that’s	all	there	is.				 What	about	biology?	Here	there	is	still	an	ominous	hint	of	a	door	left	open	to	dualism	or	its	near-twin	vitalism.	The	standard,	if	defeasible,	assumption	in	biology	these	days	is	that	in	the	end	there	are	just	lots	of	macromolecules	and	their	constituent	atoms,	and	the	forces	that	govern	their	behavior,	even	if	it	is	extremely	useful	to	find	higher	levels	of	abstraction	from	which	to	search	for	patterns:	the	theory	of	the	cell,	for	instance,	and	molecular	genetics,	and	various	grain-levels	of	neuroscience,	evolutionary	biology	and	ecology.	There	is	no	élan	vital	or	ectoplasm	to	account	for,	so	when	the	‘behavioral	and	brain	sciences’	accomplish	their	tasks,	there	will	be	no	residual	hard	problems	to	solve.			Or	will	there?		The	perspective	adopted	by	most	in	cognitive	science	remains	agnostic	about	this,	pending	further	discoveries	about	mind	and	language.		In	the	meantime,	armed	with	our	theories	and	concepts—intension,	extension,	Boolean	operators,	propositions,	codes,	syntax,	etc.,	etc.—we	can	explore	the	realm	of	meaning	and	information-processing	in	the	brain	(or	mind)	without	settling	the	issue	of	whether	it	all	somehow	‘reduces	to’	the	
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behavior	of	molecules.	We	have	learned,	haven’t	we,		that	we	can	speak	about	information—thanks	to	Shannon’s	mathematical	theory	of	information,	Marr’s	1982)	‘computational	level,’	Newell’s	(1982)	‘knowledge	level’—in	advance	of	any	firm	anchoring	in	the	behavior	of	neurons	and	such.		I	say	‘we’	because	I	have	not,	until	now,	appreciated	how	I	myself	have	participated	and	even	contributed	to	this	comfortable	modus	operandi.	
		
2.	Starting	With	Life,	Not	Language	
	What	would	it	look	like	to	abandon	this	normal	perspective	on	mind	and	language	and	meaning,	and	try	to	reframe	all	the	issues	at	one	biological	level	or	another,	building	up	 to	the	niceties	of	yearning	and	doubt,	prosody	and	implicature	from	the	ground	floor	of	meaning,	in	the	origin	of	life	itself?		I	commend	to	the	readers	of	
Mind	and	Language	a	pioneering	essay	by	evolutionary	biologist	(and	amateur	philosopher,	in	the	best	sense	of	both	terms)	David	Haig,	‘Making	Sense:	information	interpreted	as		meaning,’	(this	volume),	which	boldly	outlines	just	such	a	project.	It	will	upset	any	reader	who	is	sure	that	the	‘proper’	meanings	of	the	key	terms	are	being	flouted	or	ignored.		Real	interpretation,	real	meaning,	is	not	to	be	found	in	the	reactions	of	molecules	to	other	molecules,	but	in	the	reactions	of	sentient	intelligences	to	perceptions	and	communications.		I	urge	that	such	reactions	be	stifled	for	the	time	being,	until	Haig’s	alternative	perspective	can	be	seen	in	action,	a	strange	but	beautiful	inversion	of	reasoning	with	a	bounty	of	insights.	(It	reminds	
	 7	
me	of	the	fabled	qualms	about	admitting	zero	as	a	number;	whatever	your	misgivings,	give	it	a	chance	and	see	if	you	like	the	results.)				 Haig	is	not	by	any	means	the	first	to	try	to	ground	meaning	in	biology,	turning	away	from	what	we	might	call	the	linguicentric	tradition.		Ruth	Millikan’s	pioneering	work	(1984)	has	led	to	a	variety	of	‘teleosemantic’	theories	(Papineau,	1998,	Shea,	2007,	and	others).	Paul	Churchland	(1995,	2012)	on	vector	coding,	Brian	Skyrms	(2010)	on	signals,	and	Terrence	Deacon	(1997,	2011)	are	all	important	contributors	to	this	centrifugal	agenda,	and	some	of	my	own	work	(e.g.,	2001)	has	concentrated	on	exposing	and	resisting	the	siren	song	of	the	‘propositional	attitude	task	force.’		Lean,	2014,	develops	congenial	points,	but	Haig	is	the	first,	to	my	knowledge,	to	simply	defy	tradition	and	propose	alternative	readings	of	the	standard	terms,	information,	choice,	meaning,	intention,	interpretation,	text,	and	thereby	everything	that	we	build	from	them.	This	defiance	can	perhaps	be	most	directly	motivated	by	noting	that	none	of	these	terms,	however	ubiquitous	in	theories	and	models	of	mind	and	language,	have	ever	settled	down	with	consensual	definitions.	Every	one	of	them	is	an	attractor	of	controversy,	so	why	not	start	fresh	and	see	what	happens?				 The	governing	insight	is	that	we	can	better	understand	what	‘real’	choices	are,	what	‘real’	interpretation	is,	what	‘real’	meaning	is	if	we	consider	first	the	primordial	phenomena	on	which	and	out	of	which	these	must	be	built:		the	simplest	possible	differences	that	make	a	difference,	the	most	rudimentary	‘choices’	
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imaginable.		This	enables	Haig	to	undo	the	divorce	between	‘Shannon	information’	and	‘semantic	information’	by	seeing	how	to	unite	the	striking	features	of	these	warring	perspectives	into	a	single	account	of	how	information	is	used	in	life,	including	our	own	highly	articulated	intellectual	lives.3		 Information	is	what	could	have	been	otherwise	before	observation.	Meaning	is	what	would	have	been	otherwise	had	the	observation	been	different.	(Haig,	ms.	p24)			 A	device	that	strikes	a	match	unless	it	‘observes’	(detects)	the	presence	of	hydrogen	‘uses’	information	to	govern	its	‘choice’	to	strike	the	match,	and	is	‘undecided’	until	it	gets	that	information	and	‘interprets’	that	information	by	striking	or	not	striking	the	match.	Such	a	simple	device	could	be	invented	by	a	(not	very)	intelligent	designer,	or	it	could	evolve.		Establishing	just	such	a	(type	of)	causal	link	is	the	basic	or	atomic	design	step	out	of	which	all	other	design-making	must	be	constructed.	Where	before	there	was	no	regular	causal	link	between	hydrogen-presence	and	not-striking-a-match,	now	there	is,	and	it	can	be	a	useful	causal	regularity	worth	keeping.		Dretske’s	(1981,	1994)	attention	was	rightly	drawn	to	such	second-order	causes	of	causal	regularities,	but	he	was	stymied	by	the	task	of	saying	when	there	was	enough	design,	or	specificity,	or	complexity	to	warrant	assigning	meaning	to	the	activity	involved	(for	instance,	in	his	attempt	to	distinguish																																																									3	Dennett	(2017)	was	completed	before	I	had	digested	Haig’s	ideas,	and	Chapter	6	of	that	book,	‘What	is	Information?’,	now	stands	in	need	of	revisions	just	weeks	after	appearing	in	print.	This	essay	is	a	first	installment	of	that	editorial	process.			
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‘epistemic	seeing’	from	‘non-epistemic	seeing’).	Haig	doesn’t	bother:	it	may	become	more	and	more	convenient	to	speak	the	shorthand	of	meaning-assignments	as	systems	become	more	complicated	in	their	causal	intermeshing,	but	there	is	no	point	at	which,	as	Fodor	(1987,	p104)	once	memorably	put	it,	‘a	whistle	blows’	heralding	the	fixation	of	Meaning.			 Instead	of	treating	the	bacterium’s	response	to	the	presence	of	a	molecule	as	a	fringe	or	degenerate	or	merely	metaphorical	case	of	meaning,	lacking	most	of	the	‘essential’	components	of	what	we	usually	mean	by	meaning,	consider	treating	it	as	the	most	fundamental	example	of	meaning:	the	simplest	case.	Then,	treating	
intention	to	cover	the	rationales	of	evolved	designs	as	literally	as	the	rationales	of	human	designers,	we	can	say,	literally,	that	‘interpreters	are	intentional	mechanisms	that	have	evolved	or	been	designed	to	use	information	in	choice,’	(ms	p3)	and	define	‘a	text	as	an	interpretation	intended	to	inform	subsequent	choice.’	(ms	p8)		and	go	on	to	say	that	the	mutation	that	causes	hemophilia	in	males	does	so	via	a	process	in	which	histidine	and	hemophilia			‘are	the	intended	meanings	of	interpreters	[ribosomes]	that	have	evolved	to	represent	whatever	text	they	are	presented.	But,	histidine	and	hemophilia	are	unintended	from	the	perspective	of	the	organism:	none	of	the	fetus’s	male	ancestors	possessed	the	mutant	protein	or	suffered	from	hemophilia.’	(ms	p13)		The	same	strategy	of	analysis	yields	rich	and	unified	accounts	of	the	tangled	history	of	the	Zimmerman	telegram,	the	sincere	advice	of	fortune-tellers,	and	the	
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underlying	rationale	of	the	injury-feigning	bird,	among	many	other	phenomena.	(Examples	are	the	key;	you	don’t	really	appreciate	the	power	of	definitions	until	you	see	the,	work	in	multiple	cases.)	Then,	with	these	new	foundations	in	place	Haig	can	go	on	to	define	a	percept	as	a	private	text,	‘an	interpretation	of	sensory	input	intended	to	inform	subsequent	interpretation.’	(ms	p10),	and	then	reflexively	characterize	his	project	in	its	own	terms:			 My	written	text	attempts	to	rearrange	the	associations	of	‘meaning’	and	‘information’	in	your	private	texts	to	change	how	you	interpret	and	use	these	words.	It	is	an	invitation	to	join	a	language-game	in	which	these	new	definitions	are	the	rules	of	play.	(ms	p22)			 Instead	of	attempting	to	summarize	Haig’s	elegant	and	succinct	proposals,	I	will	simply	note	a	few	of	the	philosophical	topics	on	which	they	shed	surprising	light:			 1.	the	debate	over	causation	as	mechanism	versus	causation	as	difference-making,			2.	the	reason	why	an	epistemic—not	metaphysical—concept	of	possibility	does	all	the	heavy	lifting	in	the	context	of	the	puzzles	about	free	will,			
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3.	the	relation	between	the	butterfly	effect	and	attractor	states,	and	the	implications	of	this	for	cognition:	‘Bodily	attractors	at	all	levels—from	the	molecular,	to	the	cellular,	to	the	individual—buffer	organismal	fates	from	the	unforeseen.	This	cancellation	of	irrelevant	differences	allows	“focus”	on	what	is	relevant.’				 No	doubt	my	high	opinion	of	Haig’s	essay	is	due	in	part	to	the	fact	that	it	clarifies,	extends	and	corrects	points	I	have	long	attempted—unsuccessfully—to	convey	to	my	colleagues.	I	have	often	tried	to	show	that,	whether	the	topic	is	what	the	frog’s	eye	tells	the	frog’s	brain,	or	what	Hamlet	told	Ophelia,	or	what	the	best	translation	of	a	sentence	from	French	to	English	must	preserve,	our	inability	to	‘express’	the	‘content’	in	some	canonic	medium	of	communication	or	information-registration	is	not	a	bug	but	a	feature.	Haig	shows	why	and	how	we	may	contrive	all	manner	of	intermediate	levels	of	expression	or	interpretation	but	need	not	hunt	for	a	dividing	line	that	distinguishes	comprehension	from	mere	reaction.		Instead	of	saying,	as	some	in	the	linguicentric	tradition	might	want	to	put	it,	that	it’s	coding	and	syntax	‘all	the	way	down,’	we	can	now	appreciate	that	it’s	interpretation	all	the	way	up.		Many	of	the	difficult	problems	with	which	theorists	of	mind	and	language	wrestle	remain	unresolved,	but	there	is	reason	to	believe	that	Haig’s	strange	inversion	will	open	up	unconsidered	prospects	that	have	great	promise.						
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Abstract: An interpreter is a mechanism that uses information in choice. The capabilities of the 
interpreter couple an entropy of inputs (uncertainty) to an entropy of outputs (indecision). The first entropy 
is dispelled by observation (input of information). The second entropy is dispelled by choice of action 
(output of decision). I propose that an interpreter’s response to inputs (information) be considered the 
meaning of the information for the interpreter. In this conceptual framework, the designed or evolved 
mechanisms of interpreters provide the much-debated link between Shannon information and semantics. 
 
In principio erat finis. 
A mechanical device strikes a match and a candle is lit or there is an explosion. The striking of the match 
(+M) and the presence of oxygen (+O) are the same in both scenarios. The difference that makes the 
difference as to whether or not there is an explosion (±E) is the presence versus absence of hydrogen (±H). 
A more sophisticated device strikes a match contingent on input from a hydrogen sensor. If the sensor 
reports no hydrogen (–H), the match is struck (+M). If the sensor reports hydrogen (+H), the match is not 
struck (–M). The first device is an effector of an explosion in the presence of hydrogen but does not ‘choose’ 
the explosion because it does not ‘use’ information. It couples a state of the world (±H) to an outcome (±E). 
The second device ‘prefers’ darkness to an explosion in the presence of hydrogen. It couples one bit of 
information about the world (±H) to one degree of freedom in action (±M). It ‘responds’ to +H with –M 
and –H with +M. It is ‘undecided’ until the observation of what was uncertain (information) is interpreted 
in definite action (meaning). 
The first difference in the phrase ‘a difference that makes a difference’ is cause, the difference-maker 
or independent variable, and the second is effect, the difference-made or dependent variable. But whether 
the second difference is an interpretation of the first depends on the evolved or designed function of an 
interpreter. The first device does not interpret. Things just happen (±H, ±E). For the second device, the 
first difference is information (±H) and the second is meaning (±M). For an outside interpreter of the 
second device, ±H and ±M contain mutual (or redundant) information: either can be inferred to ‘mean the 
other’. The observer can predict whether or not the match will be struck (meaning) by observing whether or 
not hydrogen is present (information) or could infer whether or not hydrogen was present (meaning) by 
observing whether or not the match was struck (information). 
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On what reasoned grounds can I claim that the second device interprets the presence of hydrogen as a 
reason not to light a candle but reject the seemingly parallel claim that the first device interprets the 
presence of hydrogen as a reason to cause an explosion. My argument made an implicit appeal to proper 
functions (Millikan, 1989). The proper function of the first device is lighting candles. Explosions are 
unintended consequences. The proper function of the second device is the use of information to decide 
whether or not to strike a match.  
The responses of an interpreter with one degree of freedom of interpretation may seem mechanical 
and uncomprehending, hardly deserving the ‘meaningful’ label, but any truly sophisticated interpreter will 
have many degrees of freedom with multiple levels of internal interpretation in which the interpretation of 
one part of the system is news (and hence information) to other parts of the system. Consider multiple 
rewirings of a complex device such that each new device responds to the same inputs with different outputs. 
There is only a shallow sense in which the inputs of these devices are causes of the devices’ outputs. An 
understanding of how inputs are interpreted as outputs requires an understanding of a device’s inner 
workings. An understanding of why a device interprets particular inputs as particular outputs requires an 
understanding of the device’s function and history. We cannot invoke an omniscient homunculus within the 
system that has an overview of all that the system ‘knows’ (Dennett, 1991). An interpreter cannot ‘know’ 
what it will choose until it chooses—if it ‘knows’ it has chosen—but an observer can often predict a 
consistent interpreter’s choices with confidence. 
Dewey (1896) recognized that “stimulus and response are not distinctions of existence, but teleological 
distinctions, that is, distinctions of function, or part played, with reference to reaching or maintaining an 
end.” One cannot simply draw an arbitrary boundary around part of a complex web of processes, describe 
all causes crossing the boundary from outside to inside as stimuli, all causes crossing from inside to outside 
as responses, and all processes within the boundary as interpretation. Interpreters are intentional 
mechanisms that have evolved or been designed to use information in choice. 
Teleology of Interpretation 
Meaning and function are intentional terms. Fighting the good cause (Haig, 2014) grounded talk of biological 
function in the unintended teleology of adaptation by natural selection (following Papineau, 1984; Dennett, 
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1987, 1995; Millikan, 1989; Neander, 1991). Final causes were presented as efficient, even indispensable, 
summaries of complex concatenations of efficient causes. A token effect cannot precede its token cause. But 
when one generalizes from causes of tokens to causes of kinds, effect-tokens both precede and succeed 
cause-tokens in recursive processes. A full causal account of an egg or a chicken contains long series of past 
chickens and past eggs. An egg is both an effect of a chicken-that-was and a cause of a chicken-to-be. 
‘Natural selection’ subsumes all processes by which the environment selects a subset from a set of actual 
things. Reproduction replenishes numbers of the diminished subset before the next round of selection. 
Although nature’s ‘choices’ are unintended, some of her ‘choices’ leave genetic records that allow repetition 
of that which was ‘chosen’ as intended choices of living beings. Reproductive recursion is rescued from 
eternal recurrence of the same by the input of new variation via mutation and the shuffling of genetic texts 
in sexual reproduction. By these processes, recursively selected subsets accumulate information about what 
worked in the past (Haig, 2014). And what worked was the interpretation of information from the 
environment in ‘real time’ rather than evolutionary time. As a consequence, the world now abounds with 
biological interpreters that select which differences will make a difference from the myriad potential causes in 
their environment and choose actions from sets of possible actions on the basis of observations that could have 
been different. The mapping of possible inputs to outputs is embodied in the interpreter’s fine structure, 
with the fit between information and meaning—the efficaciousness of interpretation—derived from past 
natural selection refined by developmental processes during the interpreter’s life. Information is used, in the 
sense of Shannon (1948), to refer to the reduction of uncertainty of a receiver provided by a particular 
input. 
To ‘intend’ is to choose for anticipated effects. Two kinds of intentionality can be distinguished. 
Primary intentionality is the repetition of causes that worked in the past. This is the intentionality of 
adaptation by natural selection and of conditioned reflexes. Past effects are anticipated to occur again. 
Secondary intentionality is choice of action after simulation of possible choices and their effects. Simulated 
effects are anticipated to occur when the action is performed. Secondary intentionality requires an ability to 
‘hold in mind’ and evaluate virtual outcomes. Primary intentionality is ‘primary’ in the sense that it evolved 
before secondary intentionality. 
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In Fighting the good cause (Haig, 2014), information was said to have meaning for an interpreter when it was 
used to achieve an end. The present paper simplifies and clarifies by explicitly equating meaning with the 
interpretation. The action or thing chosen is the meaning of the information for the interpreter. Information 
resides in the differences among things that are ‘possible’ until observation of an actual thing. Meaning is 
the response of the interpreter to the observation and is itself an actual thing that can be observed and used 
as information by another interpreter. By these definitions, ‘semantic information’ is a contradiction in 
terms. 
Information and Meaning 
An interpreter can be viewed as an input–output device that uses observations to choose actions (Figure 1). 
Interpretation subsumes all internal processes that couple observations (information) to choice of action 
(meaning). The number of independent things a device could observe can be considered a measure of its 
uncertainty (entropy of observation). The number of independent actions in its repertoire of response can be 
considered a measure of its indecision (entropy of action). Uncertainty is resolved by observation and 
indecision by choice. Pearl’s (2000) causal models can be considered a class of interpreters in which the do-
operator, which fixes the value of an input variable, performs the role of observation. Tononi’s (2004) 
integration of information refers to internal causal processes of interpreters. 
An interpreter’s possible inputs are the things to which it could respond. Its possible outputs are the ways in 
which it could respond. These capabilities are subjective competences of the interpreter not objective properties 
of its world. Observations inform, whether the thing observed is ontologically uncertain (undetermined until 
observation) or epistemically uncertain (determined but ‘unknown’ until observation). Observation of what 
is epistemically uncertain provides information about prior events. Meanings may be ‘mistaken’ because of 
malfunction, unanticipated inputs, or because what was once adaptive is now maladaptive. Unintended 
meanings may be used as information by other interpreters or by the same interpreter in self-reflection. 
My purpose in this ‘behaviorist’ account is not to belittle the complexities of interpretation but to 
argue there is no ghost in the semantics. Information resides in distinguishable things in the interpreter’s 
world and the meaning of a particular input for the interpreter is simply whatever physical thing (print on 
paper, sound vibrations, neural states, etc.) is the output of information processing by the interpreter. The 
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complexities reside in how the inner workings of the interpreter map observations onto actions. There is no 
non-material domain in which meanings reside outside of physical interpretation. If you protest that this 
paragraph means more than ink marks on paper or pixels on a screen, then those marks or pixels have been 
input to a very sophisticated interpreter, your good self, and I thank you for reading. 
Consider a paradigmatic small dark something moving across a frog’s visual field that causes the frog 
to stick out its tongue to intercept the thing. If we treat the frog as a black box, photons falling on retinas are 
information (input); sticking out the tongue is meaning (output). If we were to peek inside the frog’s brain, 
we would find multiple interpretations of interpretations between sensory excitation and motor action. My 
claim is that each physical state can be considered the meaning of prior information processing and that 
these states inform subsequent neural states that are themselves new meanings. The frog’s visual system 
interprets incident photons as information about distance, direction of movement, and speed of the speck. 
These meanings inform subsequent interpretation as motor action. The frog minimizes immediate 
interpretation of a speck’s nature so as not to give a fly time to interpret the frog’s intentions (a small dark 
object in the mouth is worth ten flies that got away). Once the moving something is intercepted, the frog has 
ample time to interpret whether the thing is food and what kind of food (using oral rather than visual 
sensors) and to modify its sensory criteria for future protrusions of the tongue. 
Any spoken or written claim by a philosopher about what internal states mean to the frog—whether 
‘fly,’ ‘food’ or ‘small moving thing’—is an interpretation of the philosopher and the philosopher’s meaning 
not the frog’s meaning. If we were to peek inside the black boxes of philosophers’ minds there would 
undoubtedly be many interpretations of interpretations, meanings of meanings, before keys were struck on 
keyboards or words spoken or shouted. If a literate frog were to write a memoir of her experience, she 
might report that she saw the speck as a fly but was mistaken. Her interpretation would be of similar kind to 
the philosophers’ interpretations. An interpreter, even an interpreter of itself, never has direct access to 
things in themselves but only to information about things. 
The claim that meaning is whatever physical thing an interpreter interprets information to mean is a 
definition, not a claim that all interpretations are equally useful. Some interpretations are ‘better’ than 
others because they inform more subsequent interpretations or enable meaningful interpretation of what 
was previously uninterpretable. Our perceptions have evolved to present useful information about the 
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world to guide our actions, and our interpretations of words have evolved, from childhood, to make sense of 
what others are saying. Although information and meaning are defined relative to an interpreter as subject, 
interpreters may aspire or have evolved to interpret information objectively (Lindley 2000). 
Tools and Texts 
The non-living world is a repository of unintended information useful for living interpreters. Unintended 
information is also present in interpretations of other interpreters. When an interpretation is reinterpreted, 
one must distinguish the intentions of the first interpreter (the producer) from those of the second 
interpreter (the consumer). The evasive movements of a gazelle being pursued by a cheetah are intended to 
make the gazelle harder to catch. The cheetah observes and interprets these movements with the intention 
of catching the gazelle. The cheetah’s interpretation is unintended by the gazelle.  
When a healthy gazelle sees a hunting dog rather than a cheetah, it interprets the situation as an 
occasion to stot (jump up and down). Hunting dogs preferentially chase gazelles that do not stot or stot 
more feebly. A vigorous gazelle and a hunting dog both benefit from the hunting dog chasing a more feeble 
gazelle. The hunting dog’s decision to chase a non-stotting gazelle is intended by the stotting gazelle. The 
evolutionary rationale of stotting is thought to be that stotting ‘signals’ to the hunting dog that the gazelle 
has a good chance of outlasting the hunting dog in an extended pursuit and is therefore not worth chasing 
(FitzGibbon and Fanshawe 1988). But this is an interpretation of behavioral ecologists not, as far as we 
know, of either gazelles or hunting dogs. Their interpretations are simply stotting and not chasing. (Gazelles 
do not stot to cheetahs because cheetahs lack endurance but are capable of short bursts of great speed. 
Gazelles interpret cheetahs as reasons to get far away as quickly and unpredictably as possible.) 
Interpretations are tools to achieve ends. Some tools are intended to be used as information by 
subsequent interpreters or by the interpreter itself at some later time. I will use text to refer to an 
interpretation intended to inform subsequent choice. A text is an output of an author (producer) intended to 
be input to a reader (consumer). A text anticipates interpretive competence of intended readers. It may be a 
static object or dynamic performance. By this expanded definition, written documents, works of art, DNA 
and mRNA, neural activity, and the tape of a Turing machine are all texts. My spoken words are an 
ephemeral text ‘written’ in sound intended to be interpreted by listeners. A painting is a persistent text 
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‘written’ in pigment intended to be interpreted by viewers. Parallel white lines crossing a road are texts 
intended to be interpreted by pedestrians as places to cross and by motorists as places where pedestrians 
cross. A peacock’s tail is a text intended to arouse the admiration of peahens. Stotting is a text intended to 
discourage hunting dogs. 
An author’s intended interpretation of a text should be distinguished from the actual interpretation of 
the reader. A hunting dog who detects unintended evidence of weakness in a gazelle’s performance may 
chase a stotting gazelle. The author’s intentions are also distinct from how the author intends a text to be 
interpreted by readers. Some texts are deceptive. The folded wings of a camouflaged moth are intended to 
be interpreted as ‘not a moth’ by moth-predators but the flash of ‘eye spots’ as the moth unfolds its wings 
for flight are intended to be interpreted, for a crucial split-second, as ‘eyes of a moth-predator predator’. If 
these texts are interpreted by moth-predators as intended by the moth, then they have served their purpose 
and have been interpreted as intended by the author by being misinterpreted by the reader. 
A completed nest contains clues about its construction. If birds model their own nest on the nest in 
which they hatched, then the parental nest informs the construction of the offspring nest. If parents 
constructed nests in ways that were easily interpreted by offspring and this method of construction was 
repeated because it enhanced the survival of the parents’ grandoffspring in offsprings’ nests, then the nest is 
a text of the parents with an intended interpretation by offspring. This example shows that a thing may 
function both as a simple tool (for holding eggs) and as a text (for instructing offspring). When the Mafia 
leave the body of an informer in a town square, the murder is both a direct means to an end (removal of an 
informer) and a text (a warning to potential informers). 
The broken-wing display of a ground-nesting bird is a text intended to be interpreted as ‘here is easy 
prey’ by a predator. The function of the bird’s ‘helpless fluttering’ is to lead the predator away from hidden 
eggs that are truly easy prey. If the predator recognizes the display as a text, concludes that ‘a nest is near’, 
and searches for the nest, then the text has failed to to be interpreted as intended but the predator has 
correctly interpreted the situation. If, on the other hand, the bird truly had a broken wing, then its 
seemingly helpless fluttering would indeed be helpless fluttering, and an attempt to escape, rather than a 
text with an intended interpretation. The predator would truly interpret the bird’s actions if it concluded 
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‘here is easy prey.’ If the predator mistakenly interpreted helpless fluttering as ‘a broken-wing display’ and 
started looking for a nest then the predator would have misinterpreted the situation.  
One could imagine a bird with an actual broken wing ‘unconvincingly’ attempting to escape with the 
intention that the predator interpret its actions as ‘this is a broken wing display therefore the bird is not easy 
prey but a nest is near’. If the predator started to search for a nest, then the predator would have recognized 
that the bird’s actions were a text, would have interpreted the text as intended by the bird, but would have 
misunderstood the bird’s intentions. The text would have achieved the bird’s intention but foiled the 
intention of the predator who had been ‘deliberately’ misled. 
Ultraviolet photons cause damage to unpigmented skin. Some skins respond to ultraviolet exposure by 
deposition of melanin. For skins that do not respond in this way, ultraviolet photons are not used as 
information and simply cause unintended damage. For skins that are able to darken, ultraviolet photons are 
interpreted by the skin as melanin which is employed as a tool to prevent further damage. An observer of 
tanned skin can infer that the skin has been exposed to the sun and that, depending on context, the skin’s 
owner works in the fields, rather than at a desk, or has sufficient leisure to spend time at the beach. Because 
possession of leisure has social value, some people choose to expose their skin to solar lamps so as to be 
interpreted as possessors of leisure. In this case, tanned skin is a text intended to inform interpretations of 
intended observers. 
An interpretation (a meaning) can be considered to ‘represent’ the interpreted information and to be 
an ascription of content to the information by the interpreter. Representation raises intriguing questions about 
how internal processes of an interpreter derive meaning from information and why the interpreter has 
evolved or been designed to interpret information in the way that it does. A text not only ‘represents’ 
information used by its author in the text’s composition but ‘presents’ information to intended readers. 
Presentation raises additional questions of how authors anticipate readers’ responses. 
Texts do not act directly but indirectly through the interpretations of readers. Texts do nothing, in 
and of themselves, but one need only consider the Quran, Declaration of Independence, and Protocols of the Elders of 
Zion to appreciate the differences texts can make in the world. 
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Private and Public Texts 
The inner workings of complex interpreters involve delegation of tasks among sub-interpreters, each 
presenting texts for use by other sub-interpreters. These private texts, intended for internal use, all have a 
physical form. Some are ephemeral. A percept is an interpretation of sensory input intended to inform 
subsequent interpretation. Others are persistent. A memory is a textual record to be consulted when 
needed. Consciousness itself is a private text; our mental desktop, a very short-term memory written in we 
know not what medium, consulted by other sub-interpreters to know where to ‘look’ for relevant 
information. The scene that is seen functions as a simplified and constantly updated interpretation of the 
world that is compared against incoming percepts for detection of relevant differences. 
I view a landscape by Claude Monet in which artfully arranged splodges of color on canvas present a 
scene on the Seine with sailboats and a group of five ducks to one side. Not only do I see the play of light on 
water but I hear the clink of rigging as the boats rock at anchor. These meanings are my interpretations. 
My companion sees gulls rather than ducks. As I move in toward the canvas, the things that I see dissolve 
into ill-formed blobs. The ducks are revealed as no more than five dabs of white paint. The scene that I saw 
was underdetermined by input from my eyes, but Monet’s genius was to suggest, with minimal means, 
internal sources of information that filled in the picture. He created the illusion of detail that I expected to 
find when I looked closely. This paragraph does not contain all the information I want to inform your 
interpretation. By the artful placement of ink on paper I want to suggest paintings and scenes you have seen 
in order to evoke an “Aha! I see what he means.” I particularly want you to see that an author always relies 
on rich sources and resources in the private texts of his readers for them to make sense of his public text. 
(This paragraph was informed by a parallel analysis of a painting by Bellotto in Dennett 2005, p. 65) 
My text is the product of multiple drafts of an evolving text. In the process of reading and re-reading, 
writing and re-writing, I came to understand what I meant and I mean (Haig, 2011). My meaning is the 
public text that you see, not some nebulous sense in my mind to which the text points. As my aging mind 
becomes less nimble, I rely more and more on public texts of previous selves as aides-memoire of what I wish 
to mean. What persists in my brain are reworked memories of earlier drafts and regrets about what I wrote 
poorly. Once a text is published its meanings for readers are untethered from its author’s intentions. My 
meaning becomes your meaning as you read my text.  
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Meanings of Genes 
Cells contain three very important interpreters that evolved long ago to interpret aperiodic polymers: DNA 
polymerases complement sense strands of DNA with their antisense strand; RNA polymerases transcribe 
sense strands of DNA as RNA; and ribosomes translate messenger RNAs (mRNAs) as proteins. For the 
DNA polymerase, the meaning of a DNA strand is its complement. For the RNA polymerase, the meaning 
of the DNA strand is an mRNA. For the ribosome, the meaning of the mRNA is a protein. Thus, the same 
DNA sequence means different things to a DNA polymerase and an RNA polymerase. The information 
(input) is the same but the meaning (output) is different. DNA and mRNA are texts intended to be 
interpreted. RNA polymerases also transcribe transfer RNAs (tRNAs) and ribosomal RNAs (rRNAs). These 
are tools to be used in translation of mRNAs, not texts to be further interpreted. Among the texts 
interpreted by RNA polymerases and ribosomes are instructions for the assembly of RNA polymerases and 
ribosomes. Interpreter know thyself. 
These molecular machines are general-purpose, mindless interpreters of specialized texts. DNA 
polymerases, in particular, are like monkish scribes in the scriptorium of the Total Library of all possible 
texts (Borges, 1939) faithfully copying DNA sequences that are both unilluminated and unilluminating. One 
can posit a Library of Mendel that contains all possible DNA texts of some finite length (Dennett, 1995). 
Only an infinitesimal subset of texts the length of the human genome can ever have existed. Natural 
selection has acted in this much more restricted, yet unimaginably vast, library of Darwin that contains all 
past and present DNA texts. In this library, differences between texts that are still read and texts that are no 
longer read are a source of information about what has worked and hasn't worked in the past. 
What do genes mean? The short answer is whatever physical thing an interpreter interprets them to 
mean. A DNA strand is an interpretation of its antisense (via one round of DNA replication) and of its sense 
(via two rounds of DNA replication). But a gene can also be interpreted as an mRNA (via transcription). 
Thus, a gene means itself for a DNA polymerase but means an mRNA for an RNA polymerase. Complex 
interpreters can be built up out of simpler interpreters. A DNA strand is interpreted as a protein by the 
combined interpretative system of an RNA polymerase plus ribosome via two steps of interpretation 
(transcribed as mRNA then translated as protein). Thus, a gene means a protein for this compound 
interpreter.  
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A more contentious claim is that an organism’s genes collectively mean the organism. Past organisms 
have been responsible for the replication and transmission of present genes which are interpreted via 
complex processes of development to produce present organisms that are responsible for the replication and 
transmission of future genes. Organisms and their genomes are thus recursively related via primary 
intentionality. As such, organisms can be considered to interpret their genomes as themselves. This bald 
statement should not be over-interpreted. Every interpretation of a genomic text as an organism is unique 
because texts are always interpreted in the context of other sources of information. Organisms interpret their 
genomes in environmental context and not every detail is intended.  
The 282nd amino acid of factor VIII protein of most humans is arginine, specified by the codon CGC 
on the ‘sense’ strand of a factor VIII gene. The complementary codon on the ‘antisense’ strand GCG is the 
template for transcription of CGC in the mRNA and this triplet is translated as arginine by the ribosome. 
Cytosine (C) preceding guanine (G) can be chemically modified by attachment of a methyl group to 
produce 5-methylcytosine (5-meC). Spontaneous deamination of 5-meC converts 5-meC into thymine (T) 
creating a heritable mutation that changes ‘antisense’ GCG to GTG which is interpreted as ‘sense’ CAC by 
DNA polymerase. RNA polymerase transcribes GTG (DNA) as CAC (mRNA) which is translated as 
histidine by the ribosome. Factor VIII protein with histidine rather than arginine as the 282nd amino acid 
fails to clot blood causing life-threatening hemophilia in males. 
Mutations in DNA that change an amino acid in protein are described as nonsynonymous. DNA 
polymerases, RNA polymerases, and ribosomes faithfully interpret nonsynonymous mutations without 
regard for the functionality of the resulting protein. For a DNA polymerase, CAC means GTG (antisense) 
and CAC (sense); for an RNA polymerase, GTG means CAC; for a ribosome CAC means histidine. These 
are the intended meanings of interpreters that have evolved to represent whatever text they are presented. 
But, histidine and hemophilia are unintended from the perspective of the organism: none of the fetus’s male 
ancestors possessed the mutant protein or suffered from hemophilia. A genetic counsellor receives a 
printout of the DNA sequence of the factor VIII gene present in amniotic fluid of a male fetus whose mother 
is a carrier of a mutant gene copy on one of her X chromosomes. The difference that will make a difference 
is an A versus G in the middle position of the 282nd codon of the factor VIII gene. Before viewing the 
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printout, the counsellor is uncertain about what the data will show. If she reads A then the child will suffer 
from hemophilia but if she reads G the child will be unaffected.  
Mutations in DNA that do not change the amino acid translated by ribosomes are described as 
synonymous. An evolutionary biologist might use the ratio of non-synonymous to synonymous differences 
between two sequences to infer whether the sequences have been subject to natural selection. In this case, 
meaningless differences for an intended interpreter (ribosome) are meaningful differences for an unintended 
interpreter (biologist). 
Telegraphing One’s Intentions 
 “An engineering communication theory is just like a very proper and discreet girl at the telegraph office accepting your 
telegram. She pays no attention to the meaning, whether it be sad or joyous or embarrassing. But she must be prepared 
to deal intelligently with all messages that come to her desk.” (Weaver 1949) 
 
The Zimmermann telegram of 1917 conveyed an offer of a military alliance between the German Empire 
and the Republic of Mexico if the United States of America entered the Great War. In the event of such an 
alliance, Germany promised to provide financial support to Mexico and recognize Mexican reconquest of 
Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona.  
Great Britain cut all German telegraphic cables to the New World on 5 August 1914. Therefore the 
German message to Mexico had to be conveyed by an indirect route. A plaintext of the message in German 
was composed in Berlin by the secretary of state for foreign affairs (Arthur Zimmermann) and then 
encrypted by his staff using code 7500. The encoded message was passed to the American Embassy in 
Berlin for transmission by U.S. diplomatic channels to the German Embassy in Washington. The message 
was sent by cable from Berlin to Copenhagen, from Copenhagen to London, and then by transatlantic 
cable from London to the State Department in Washington. The encrypted message in code 7500 was 
passed to the German Embassy in Washington where it was decrypted into German and then re-encrypted 
in code 13040. Re-encryption was necessary because the German Embassy in Mexico lacked a code book 
for the more secure code 7500. The message in code 13040 was sent by telegram from the Western Union 
office in Washington to the Western Union office in Mexico City where it was printed as a typescript and 
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delivered to the German Embassy in Mexico on January 1, 1917. The typescript was decrypted into 
German by the ambassador’s secretary, before the offer was communicated by the ambassador to the 
Mexican President in Spanish.  
Unbeknownst to the governments of the United States and Germany, the telegraphic signals that 
included the message in code 7500 had been intercepted by British intelligence in London and the message 
partially decrypted. The British then requested their agents in Mexico obtain a copy of the telegram in code 
13040. The major reason for this step was to hide from the United States government that British 
intelligence was reading their diplomatic cables. British intelligence decrypted the telegram (it contained 
little unexpected for them) and then the British government provided the telegram to the American 
government in its coded form and as versions decrypted into German and translated into English. The 
message was then released by the pro-war party in the United States to the American press. The popular 
outcry hastened the entry of the United States into the war on the side of Great Britain and its allies. The 
British government had decided that the benefit of revealing the telegram to the United States would 
outweigh the unavoidable information provided to Germany that Britain could read code 13040. 
The ‘Zimmerman telegram’ passed through many texts in many media, with interpretation occurring 
at each conversion from one medium to another. Sometimes ‘the message’ was in German, sometimes in 
code 7500, sometimes in code 13040, sometimes in Morse, sometimes in Spanish, and sometimes in 
English. For the various clerks in telegraph offices in Berlin, Copenhagen, London, Washington, and 
Mexico City, the meaning of the text was simply the ‘mechanical’ transcription of a stream of dots and 
dashes into an otherwise uninterpretable string of numbers and spaces or the equally mechanical 
conversion of a string of numbers and spaces into a sequence of dots and dashes. These clerks were 
employed to interpret all texts mechanically and lacked the context to interpret encrypted texts in any other 
way. The receipt of an encrypted text by a clerk conveyed a very large amount of information, because the 
clerk had few expectations about what the text might be, but the encrypted text had no intelligible meaning 
for the clerk who lacked the key to decrypt the message. 
The staff of the German embassy in Washington obtained less information from receipt of a typescript 
in code 7500 than did the clerks through whose hands the message had passed, because the staff had much 
stronger expectations about the message. For example, the embassy staff expected the message to consist of 
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numbers and spaces only whereas the absence of letters was not a prior expectation of the telegraph clerks. 
But the message had much richer meaning for the embassy staff because they possessed code book 7500 
and were therefore able to interpret the message as words in German to be re-encrypted in code 13040 
using a different key. Because the staff were fluent in German they undoubtedly formed a mental 
interpretation (a memory) of the telegram’s content that could be called upon in the subsequent 
investigation by German intelligence of how the message had been intercepted. 
Now consider the communication of the message to Mexican President Venustiano Carranza. The 
German Ambassador to Mexico, Heinrich von Eckhardt, possessed a typescript (perhaps a manuscript) in 
German from which he made a verbal offer to Carranza in Spanish. Eckhardt’s interpretation of ink marks 
on paper as words in German involved complex interpretation into a neural text that underwent an equally 
complex process of translation into Spanish in the speech production centers of his brain. The neural text 
from the speech production centers was then conveyed to von Eckhardt’s vocal apparatus where it was 
composed as a phonic text (sound vibrations) that was received and interpreted by Carranza’s ears and 
reinterpreted at various levels in Carranza’s brain. At every step in the process, the constantly changing 
meaning was nothing more than the physical text produced by an interpreter whether this consisted of ink 
marks on paper, neural representations in brains (whatever thoughts may be), or vibrations in the air. 
Information does not reside in things but in the reduction of uncertainty (entropy) of an interpreter 
who observes a thing. That which is known does not inform. If we suppose that American intelligence kept 
copies of German diplomatic telegrams sent from the Western Union office in Washington, then the 
American government learnt nothing new from the Mexican telegram provided to them by the British 
government beyond that the British had a copy. What provided new information was the decryption of the 
telegram by British intelligence into written texts in German and English. American uncertainty about 
whether these texts contained British disinformation was dispelled when Zimmermann conceded that he 
had sent the telegram and that the decryption was accurate. 
The coded texts of the Zimmerman telegram were intended to be uninterpretable (meaningless) for 
unintended readers. This was the only reason Germany would have sent such a message via the 
intermediary of the U.S. State Department. The various code books were the private keys intended to be 
used by intended readers to interpret the strings of numbers and spaces of a typescript as an intended text in 
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German. British intelligence sought to reconstruct this intended interpretation without possession of the 
private key. Unintended information in the arrangement of code groups (‘similar’ words had ‘similar’ codes) 
provided clues that allowed British intelligence to construct their own key and interpret the message.  
My account of the convoluted transmission of the Zimmermann telegram is reconstructed from 
Friedman and Mendelsohn (1994), von zur Gathen (2006), and Freeman (2006). Interpretation of what 
actually happened is made difficult by intentional disinformation and unintentional misinformation in the 
historical record. And I may have misinterpreted the texts I have read and so may be unintentionally 
misinforming you of the details. My words will nevertheless have served their purpose if your interpretation 
of what I have written approximates how I intend you to interpret my text.  
Mutual Information and Meaning 
‘Semantic information’ views meaning as present in information prior to its interpretation. On this view, 
interpreters repackage pre-existing meaning in new media. I propose instead that meaning be considered the 
output of the interpretive process of which information is the input. On this view, answers to questions of 
meaning should be sought in the study of mechanisms of interpretation and the origins of interpretive 
competence. Once these difficult questions are answered there will be no remaining ghost in the semantics. 
A preference between ‘semantic information’ and ‘meaning as interpretation’ is a choice of how meaning is 
defined not a judgment of fact. ‘Meaning as interpretation’ sits comfortably with belief that information is 
not an objective property of things in the world but represents the epistemic uncertainty of an observer. 
Consider two sequential transformations of Arthur Zimmermann’s message to Heinrich von Eckhardt 
(Figure 2). In the first, Zimmermann’s plaintext was translated into cyphertext by one of his secretaries 
using the textual prosthesis of codebook 7500. In the second, the cyphertext was re-encoded as an electrical 
signal by a telegrath clerk using the mechanical prosthesis of a transmitter. If these transformations were 
performed as intended, then the cyphertext could be reconstructed from the signal by a telegraph receiver 
and the plaintext could be reconstructed from the cyphertext by a reader in possession of codebook 7500.  
Faithful transmission of the ‘Zimmerman telegram’ depended on mutual information (correlation or 
statistical dependency) among multiple coding systems that allowed messages to be encoded and decoded 
by senders and receivers with the appropriate expertise. Proponents of ‘semantic information’ often equate 
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meaning with mutual information or consider meaning to be derived from mutual information. In their 
view, the various texts of the ‘Zimmerman telegram’ are vehicles of a common meaning conserved through 
the many transformations of transmission. From the perspective of ‘meaning as interpretation,’ mutual 
information allows an observation of one thing to be usefully interpreted as about something else. Meaning 
does not reside in the immediate observation but in the synthesis of observation with background 
information or context in order to act effectively in the world.  
There are many unrecognized statistical dependencies in the world, but these dependencies become 
useable only once an interpreter possesses a mechanism that ‘meaningfully’ couples observation to action. 
An interpreter can ‘read’ meaning from input in one of two ways. The simplest is to be given a codebook. 
By this means, shared possession of codebook 7500 facilitated secret communication between the Foreign 
Office in Berlin and the German Embassy in Washington. The second is to construct a codebook by 
statistical inference from observations in context. This was the more difficult task achieved by British 
intelligence and when a child learns a language. 
A definition of meaning as interpretation simplifies many semantic problems. These problems include 
polysemy, how the same observation can have different meanings for different interpreters; synthesis, how 
information from multiple sources can be combined to generate new meanings; and the status of perverse 
but sincere interpretations. Consider divination by tea leaves. A fortune-teller observes the configuration of 
leaves in the bottom of a teacup and then uses the observed pattern to answer a question posed by a client. 
The pattern informs the fortune-teller’s advice if a different pattern would have resulted in different advice. 
Do all possible interpretations exist as ‘semantic information’ in the configuration of the tea leaves or does 
the fortune-teller mistakenly believe she has identified ‘semantic information’ that is absent? The 
redefinition of meaning as output avoids the horns of this dilemma and the need to distinguish ‘true’ from 
‘false’ meanings. If different fortune-tellers (or the same fortune-teller at different times) interpret similar 
patterns as similar fortunes then mutual information exists between tea leaves and fortunes but these are 
meanings of the fortune-tellers not of the tea leaves. 
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Information Theory and Meaning 
‘The fundamental problem of communication is that of reproducing at one point either exactly or approximately a 
message selected at another point. Frequently the messages have meaning; that is they refer to or are correlated 
according to some system with certain physical or conceptual entities. These semantic aspects of communication are 
irrelevant to the engineering problem.’ (Shannon 1948) 
  
Shannon (1948) and Weaver (1949) developed information theory in the context of a theory of 
communication. Weaver (1949) conceptualized communication in ‘a very broad sense to include all of the 
procedures by which one mind can affect another.’ He recognized technical, semantic, and influential 
problems of communication: technical problems were ‘concerned with the accuracy of transference of 
information from sender to receiver’; semantic problems were ‘concerned with the interpretation of 
meaning by the receiver, as compared with the intended meaning of the sender’; influential problems were 
‘concerned with the success with which the meaning conveyed to the receiver leads to the desired conduct 
on his part.’ Thus, Weaver used ‘information’ in the context of technical problems but ‘meaning’ in the 
context of semantic and influential problems. Shannon’s ‘fundamental problem of communication’ was the 
technical problem of reproducing a message accurately at another place. He adopted the design stance to 
address this technical problem and the associated mathematical theory was able to ignore problems of 
intentionality. Weaver, by contrast, adopted the intentional stance (‘intended meaning’, ‘desired conduct’) 
in talking about the semantic and influential problems, and these problems eluded mathematical treatment  
(see Dennett 1987 for discussion of the design and intentional stances). 
In Shannon’s theory ‘the actual message [was] one selected from a set of possible messages.’ He used 
logarithmic entropy—the number of independent ways in which the message could have been different—as 
a measure of information content. ‘If the number of messages in the set is finite then this number or any 
monotonic function of this number can be regarded as a measure of the information produced when one 
message is chosen from the set, all choices being equally likely.’ For Weaver, this meant that ‘The word 
information relates not so much to what you do say, as to what you could say. That is, information is a 
measure of your freedom of choice when you select a message.’ Information measured in this way had 
‘nothing to do with meaning.’ For Shannon, a message possessed meaning if it referred to, or was correlated, 
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with physical or conceptual entities ‘according to some system’. This conceptualization of meaning had two 
components: the first was the correlation (mutual information) between messages and things in the world 
and the second was the ‘system’ responsible for the correlation. 
Figure 3 is a variant of a famous figure of Shannon (1948) in which a message is selected by an 
information source and passed to a transmitter that translates the message into a signal that is transmitted to 
a receiver that back-translates the received signal as a message that is passed on to the destination. The 
signal sent and signal received differ because of inputs of unintended information (noise). The central focus 
of the figure is the channel between transmitter and receiver. The technical challenge was to ensure that the 
message passed to the destination by the receiver was as close as possible to the message passed to the 
transmitter by the information source. In Weaver’s example, ‘When I talk to you, my brain is the 
information source, yours the destination; my vocal system is the transmitter, and your ear with the eighth 
nerve is the receiver.’ Weaver and Shannon had relatively little to say about how information sources 
selected a particular message nor about how destinations interpreted the message after its receipt (nor did 
they have much to say about the internal workings of transmitters and receivers). In terms of my paper, 
information source, transmitter, receiver, and destination are all interpreters. 
Weaver and Shannon recognized the interpretation of information to be an important question but their 
focus was on the transfer of information between interpreters. My paper addresses how information is used 
rather than how it is transmitted and is concerned with the general problem of interpretation (use of 
information) of which communication—the production and interpretation of texts (things intended to be 
interpreted)—is a special case. The domain of interpretation includes the use of unintended information 
from the environment as well as the interpretation of texts. 
Large and Small 
‘If you make yourself really small, you can externalize virtually everything.’ (Dennett 1984, p. 143) 
 
The study of mechanisms is frequently connected with reductionism, the ideology that larger things are 
properly explained by properties and interactions of their smaller parts. It is incontrovertible that events at a 
small scale can have large effects. A mutation in a factor VIII gene of a single cell resulted in at least ten of 
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Queen Victoria’s male descendants suffering from hemophilia, including heirs to the thrones of Russia and 
Spain (Ingram, 1976). All genetic differences that distinguish armadillos from aardvarks and zebras from 
zebus originated in this way, as unintended mutations in single cells. 
It should also be incontrovertible that large things affect small things. My paternal grandfather was 
gassed in the Great War and as he sat upright for inspection in his hospital bed, he probably raised his right 
hand to his head. (He performed this action when dying sixty years later in a different hospital bed). The 
origin of the hand salute goes back centuries, perhaps millenia, lost in the fog of time. Among many 
theories, the salute is the ritualized removal of a hat in the presence of a superior, the raising of the visor by 
a knight in armor, or a demonstration that the weapon hand is empty, but this is conjecture. John Stewart 
Haig’s salute would have been an almost automatic gesture in the presence of an Australian or British 
officer but would not have been elicited by other outwardly similar persons; definitely not by a German 
officer. From a mechanistic perspective, his salute was caused by release of acetylcholine at neuromuscular 
junctions triggering actin filaments to slide past myosin filaments in muscle fibrils of his arm. But what 
molecular mechanism caused his hand to be raised in the presence of a person of an abstract kind? How 
does a military tradition move an ion across a membrane? 
The detritus from collisions between protons moving in opposite directions at 0.99999999c with a 
combined energy of 13 TeV has been interpreted as evidence for existence of the Higgs boson. Such events 
are created and detected at the Large Hadron Collider, housed in a circular tunnel 27 kilometers in 
circumference, spanning the Swiss–French border. The even more powerful Superconducting Supercollider 
was cancelled by the United States Congress in 1983 because of its immense cost. The differences that 
made the difference between the Higgs boson being detected in Europe rather than North America are to 
be sought in alternative political arrangements. No interpretable subatomic mechanism explains why two 
protons collide at these enormous energies in France but not in Texas. Events at the level of interpersonal 
relations and trans-Atlantic rivalries impinge upon, and predict, the movements of fundamental particles. 
Choices are the means by which big complex things control small simple things to make big differences. 
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The Parable of the Bathtub and the Meanings of Life 
Preference is an attribute of relations (differences and samenesses) rather than things (objects and events). 
To be told that someone chose x tells us nothing about his preferences unless we are also told what was 
rejected. When we choose one thing rather than another, we do not unconditionally endorse the thing 
chosen but express a preference for that thing relative to the other. We might be ‘making the best of a bad 
bargain’ or ‘choosing the lesser of two evils.’  
A dichotomous choice between x1 and x2 can usefully be expressed as a choice between, !x  + ∆x and 
!x  – ∆x where !x  = (x1 + x2)/2 is the sameness and ∆x = (x1 – x2)/2 the difference. Being told the relations 
of things, !x and  ∆x, conveys the same information as being told their identities, x1 and x2, but the relational 
form clarifies what is at stake. We choose between +∆x and –∆x, that which is different, in the context of 
!x , that which is the same. When complex identities are highly similar, relational forms allow efficiency of 
representation because the manifold samenesses need only be represented once (consider a variorum 
edition of a text with multiple versions). 
Ponder again the flame that causes or does not cause an explosion. On one hand, the striking of the 
match and the presence of oxygen do not make a difference. It is the presence versus absence of hydrogen 
that makes the difference. On the other hand, the striking of the match and the presence of oxygen are 
essential parts of the mechanism that causes the explosion. When a scientist performs a controlled 
experiment, with and without hydrogen, she converts a possible difference into two actual series of events. 
(If she varied the presence of oxygen or striking of the match, then these become experimental variables 
and potential difference makers.) Observations are of actual things, not differences among possible things. 
Actual things, not differences, participate in mechanisms. But we study mechanisms to better make a 
difference. 
Bateson (1972) defined the elementary unit of information as ‘a difference that makes a difference.’ 
The same words could be used to define a cause in difference-making accounts of causation (Lewis, 1973; 
Waters, 2007; Haig, 2014). Causation as difference-making is what could have been different. It is a history 
of paths not taken. Causation as mechanism is what could not have been otherwise. It is a history of a single 
path (one damn thing after another). The relation between these two concepts of causation is much debated 
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(Hall, 2004; Waters, 2007; Strevens, 2013). Different actions could have different outcomes but particular 
actions cause particular outcomes. One can interpret the same events as relations among identities or 
among differences and slip facilely between these perspectives.  
An interpreter is an evolved or designed mechanism that couples entropy of observation (possible 
inputs) to entropy of action (possible outputs). These degrees of freedom are capabilities of the mechanism 
(what it could observe and what it could do). The interpreter is uncertain and undecided until an actual input 
is interpreted as actual action. Information is what could have been otherwise before observation. Meaning 
is what would have been otherwise had the observation been different. Interpretation couples information 
(difference maker) to meaning (difference made). For an interpreter that has evolved to intervene in its own 
fate, the only useful information is about differences that could make a difference.  
Causation as difference-making projects our epistemic uncertainty onto the world of mechanisms, 
including the mechanisms of our choices. In a singular universe in which token events happen once, why 
should ‘could have been otherwise’ be less respectable than ‘could not have been otherwise’? What 
difference does it make? How can one decide? Fisher (1934) flipped a bit in my mind and I now choose 
‘could have been otherwise’ but I understand neither the difference nor what is at stake. The bit could flip 
back. From the perspective of ‘could have been otherwise’, our choices change the world. We have evolved to 
choose because past choices have made a difference and future choices will make a difference. 
An event’s causal influence can wax or wane. The ‘butterfly effect’, whereby the flapping of wings in 
Marilia causes a downpour in Sydney, expresses the intuition that small differences can have large effects. 
The existence of dynamic attractors has the opposite implication. Attractors cancel differences. Consider a 
bathtub. Whether water enters the tub from a spilled cup, the shower-head, the cold faucet or the hot 
faucet, it goes down the drain. The tub is literally a basin of attraction. All the degrees of freedom of water 
molecules to move ‘as they will’ come to naught because the predispositions of the tub are imposed upon 
them willy-nilly ‘against their will’. Each water molecule has a unique narrative of how it came to the drain 
but these disparate histories have no future consequences. These are differences that do not make a 
difference. And it is the form of the tub that cancels past differences, not the matter from which it is made. 
The bathtub enforces its will. 
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The vortex that forms as water exits a tub is a recurrent attractor. The living world abounds in 
recurrent goal-directed attractors because ‘endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and 
are being, evolved’ (Darwin, 1859). Convergent structures are attractors in adaptive space over evolutionary 
time. Adult forms are attractors in morphological space over developmental time. Innate and learned 
actions are attractors in performance space over behavioral time. Cultural conventions are attractors in 
social space by which a group’s members converge on common meanings. Minor variations of font or 
pronunciation make little difference in how words are understood. Word tokens are rocks of stability that 
facilitate freedom of expression. A salute is a strange attractor indeed. 
Organisms embody elaborate hierarchies of homeostatic attractors that ensure basic functions are 
unperturbed by causal fluctuations at multiple spatial and temporal scales. Bodily attractors at all levels—
from the molecular, to the cellular, to the individual—buffer organismal fates from the unforeseen. This 
cancellation of irrelevant differences allows ‘focus’ on what is relevant. From the myriad potential causes in 
its world, an organism selects those that are applicable for its needs to intervene adaptively at decision 
points. The organism is an ‘unmoved mover’ moved by self-selected information in pursuit of intended 
ends. It determines which differences will make a difference. The regress of responsibility stops here. 
Organisms pull their own strings. 
Life is eternal recurrence. The thing that hath been shall be and that which was done shall be done. 
But when a sperm fuses with an egg, the nascent interpreter is something new under the sun. Why a zygote 
receives one set of genes rather than another can be considered chance, a concatenation of random events 
that picks one from the numberless possibilities that could have been sampled from its mother’s and father’s 
genomes. The fall of the cards cannot be anticipated, but each organism attempts to play the best hand that 
it can with the cards it is dealt. Each hand is new but the cards are ancient. Many designs have been tried 
and found wanting. Our genetic cards convey selected information from the deep past to be used with 
information from current events to inform our choices in a rapidly changing world. We play our hands and 
the cards are reshuffled. 
The meaning of a life is the life that is lived. Your body is an interpretation of your life. Dualism 
divides this indivisible body into parts that are tools to be used once a choice has been made and parts that 
are texts used in choosing. When an organism acts, it is the organism’s evolutionary and developmental 
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history that determines to which information it responds and how it responds. The organism exerts its will 
as the lead actor in its own narrative, as a canceller of irrelevant causes and of competing narratives. Yet, 
despite this autonomy of action, many actors succumb to the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune, to 
factors beyond their control, foremost among which are narratives of other actors.  
Self-reflective organisms (selves) respond to their world with internal changes that rewire connections 
between inputs and outputs to make more effective future choices; learn from experience which inputs to 
attend and which to ignore; perfect performance by practice with feedback from past action; and possess 
rich memories to inform future choice. Highly sophisticated selves augment their behaviors by observation 
of what works for other actors; learn from the instruction of parents and other tutors; and choose principles 
by which to live in pursuit of self-chosen goals. These internal changes comprise an embodied memory of 
the self’s life-experience (the meaning of its life). This intricate and intimate private text, an interpretation 
intended to be self-interpreted, seamlessly melds ancient wisdom of genetic and cultural texts with news 
from the senses. It is responsive and responsible. It is the material and mortal soul that dies with the body. 
In the beginning was mechanism. Things happened. The origin of interpretation was the origin of 
intentional difference-making. Choice became free as degrees of freedom of observation and intended 
action broadened and deepened. To understand a free choice, one must understand an interpreter’s soul. 
In fine est principium. 
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Figure 1: An interpreter is a computational mechanism for which information is input and meaning is 
output. 
Figure 2: The interpretation of the plaintext of the Zimmermann telegram as a telegraphic signal. 
Figure 3: Shannon's (1948) diagram in which a message selected by an information source is transmitted to 
a destination. 
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Appendix: Words about words.1 
‘Alle Begriffe, in denen sich ein ganzer Prozeß semiotisch zusammenfaßt, entziehen sich der Definition; 
definierbar ist nur das, was keine Geschichte hat.’ (Nietzsche 1887) 
 
When I query an informant about what a thing means I frame the question as a linguistic text (spoken or 
written) and am answered with a linguistic text. We communicate meanings with words. For many 
philosophers, questions of meaning are primarily questions about language but this paper generalizes the 
concept of meaning to interpretations of all kinds. Linguistics and philosophy of language are vast territories 
of erudition into which an ill-informed novice should venture with trepidation. Nevertheless, I have been 
persuaded that I need to at least sketch how I would relate my account of meaning to language.  
An important reason to read a text is to understand the author’s intentions. And an important reason 
why an author might compose a text is to have her intentions understood. Languages are elaborate 
conventions, shared by communities of speakers, used for the composition and interpretation of linguistic 
texts. Conventional meanings evolve because authors and readers often both benefit from mutual 
understanding of authorial intentions, but the difference between an author’s intentions and the author’s 
intended interpretation means that language can be used to misinform as well as inform. 
This paper has defined meaning as the physical output of a process of interpretation and a text as an 
interpretation intended to be interpreted. By these definitions, two kinds of text are central to language that 
I will call public and private texts. Public texts are the strings of spoken or written words that are the 
outputs of language users and that are perceived and interpreted by other language users. Each language 
                                                            
1 This section was included in the Biology & Philosophy version of the manuscript between the sections 
entitled Information Theory and Meaning and Large and Small. It was removed from the version submitted to 
Mind & Language to meet word limits. 
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user possesses a private text used in the composition and comprehension of public texts.2 The private text 
has an intricate material form. It is a text because (1) it is a physical interpretation of the language user’s 
life-experience in the context of innate a priori knowledge about language and (2) it informs the composition 
and comprehension of public texts. The private text is informed by the evolutionary and developmental 
history of the language user, especially her lived experience of public texts. Mastery of a language is the 
context that allows decryption of texts written or spoken in words of that language. A child learns a 
language in much the same way as British intelligence broke code 7500; by observation of many exemplars 
together with inspired guesses, tested for intelligible meaning in encounters with multiple texts, all in the 
context of innate and learned knowledge of how humans think. 
Private texts develop over the course of a life from the cumulative perception and interpretation of 
public texts in the context of non-linguistic information. The forms of public texts are arbitrary conventions 
unique to each language but the initial bootstrapping—that allows a private text to be informed by public 
texts—requires key inputs from genetic texts. Public texts are designed to evoke rich associations in the 
private texts of intended auditors with the intention of modifying the auditors’ responses. The richness of 
information for auditors resides in the private text not the public text. Public texts function as conventional 
pointers to content of private texts. This function depends on communicants sharing similar-enough private 
texts because of common humanity, similar life experiences, and shared membership in a linguistic 
community (they need to speak the same language). A speaker anticipates that a listener will interpret the 
public text in much the same way as the speaker would interpret the public text. 
Words are defined using other words. For the writing of this paragraph, I opened a Magyar dictionary 
more-or-less at random and found the word csendülni followed by other words that I assumed to be a 
definition of csendülni in Magyar. The public text csendülni pointed to nothing in my private text. It evoked no 
associations in my mind. If you are not a Magyar speaker, there is probably little you can say about csendülni 
except that you believe it to be a word in Magyar on my dubious authority. Most Magyar speakers could 
probably use csendülni in conversation but it would have different associations for each speaker. Some might 
                                                            
2 Public texts and private texts are roughly synonymous with parole and langue of Saussure (1916). Private 
texts are unique to each user but the needs of mutual understanding result in mutual information, and 
convergence, among the private texts of a linguistic community. 
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have no more than a vague idea what the word ‘really’ means and might consult a Magyar dictionary for 
the ‘correct’ definition.3 (When I consult an English dictionary, I am not infrequently surprised to find that 
the definition differs markedly from what I thought the word meant.) 
In the first chapter of David Copperfield, Dickens (1849) wrote: ‘In consideration of the day and hour of 
my birth, it was declared by the nurse … first, that I was destined to be unlucky in life; and secondly, that I 
was privileged to see ghosts and spirits; both these gifts inevitably attaching, as they believed, to all unlucky 
infants of either gender, born towards the small hours on a Friday night.’ Gender has long been used as a 
synonym for sex although this sense was described as ‘now only jocular’ in the first edition of the Oxford 
English Dictionary (1899). At that time, sex was the usual term for the distinction between males and females 
but, within a century, sex was replaced by gender as the preferred term of many English speakers.  
I have studied recent semantic shifts in the use of sex and gender as a test-case for thinking about 
memetic evolution (Haig, 2004). In brief, social psychologists and psychoanalysts introduced a distinction 
between ‘socially-constructed’ gender and ‘biologically-determined’ sex in the 1960s. Gender became a 
term of art in these fields, both as a way of marking a theoretical distinction and of signaling to informed 
listeners that the speaker believed the social to be more important than the biological. Animals had sex, 
only humans had gender. From this base, gender entered general discourse via its adoption by feminists of 
the 1980s to signal their belief in the predominant influence of social factors on sex differences, but a 
sex/gender distinction is now rarely maintained. Gender commonly now refers to all differences between 
males and females whether these are social or biological. Even hamsters have genders (Robins et al., 1995). 
Haig (2004) suggested two factors played a role in the reconvergence of meanings of gender and sex. First, 
biological and social factors often interact to determine male/female differences and, in such situations, 
there was no neutral term. Gender became the safer default in cases of overlap, thus undermining the 
distinction between biological sex and cultural gender. Second, many listeners heard gender being used to 
refer to male/female differences but were uninformed of the theoretical distinction and thus adopted 
gender as the fashionable general term. 
I now suspect another factor contributed to the rise of gender and concomitant decline of sex. As a 
student explained her preference for gender to me: ‘Gender is a category but sex is an action.’ Some 
                                                            
3 My friend Apari Péter offered ‘voice of the bell’ as his spontaneous translation of csendülni. 
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speakers avoid sex because sex has copulatory connotations. Sex became a widely used euphemism for 
fucking only during the twentieth century. Did you wince when you read the ‘F-word’? I hesitated as I wrote 
it and still hesitate as I read it. Euphemisms are polite ways of referring to things we feel uncomfortable 
talking about. But, as a euphemism becomes widely adopted, our embarrassment with the subject inevitably 
rubs off on the euphemism which becomes less polite (consider the linguistic fate of toilet, now associated 
strongly with the ‘S-word’). Our hesitance in talking openly about ‘sexual activity’ has tainted sex with 
‘sexual connotations’ and created a preference for a word in which these associations are less direct.  
The public forms of sex and gender, as spoken and written texts, have remained unchanged through 
substantial changes of meaning. The important changes have been in the private associations of the public 
forms. Meanings of words have histories not essential attributes. At any one time, different speakers would 
have given different interpretations of what the public forms meant and used the public forms in different 
contexts. If enough speakers use a word ‘wrongly’ then their private definition becomes the accepted norm 
of the linguistic community. The heterodox becomes orthodox. Meaning is use. My paper attempts to 
persuade; to rearrange the associations of ‘meaning’ and ‘information’ in your private texts; to change how 
you interpret and use these words not reveal what they ‘properly’ mean. 
 
Dickens, C. 1849: David Copperfield. 
Haig, D. 2004: The inexorable rise of gender and the decline of sex: social change in academic titles, 1945–
2001. Archives of Sexual Behavior, 33, 87–96. 
Nietzsche, F. 1887: Zur Genealogie der Moral. 
Robins, S. J., Fasulo, J. M., Patton, G. M., Schaefer, E. J., Smith, D. E. and Ordovas, J. M. 1995: Gender 
differences in the development of hyperlipemia and atherosclerosis in hybrid hamsters. Metabolism, 44, 
1326–31. 
Saussure, F. de. 1916: Cours de Linguistique Générale. Paris: Payot. (translated by R. Harris 1986: Course in 
General Linguistics. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court.)  
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Dear Professor Haig, 
 
We have received the reports from our advisors on your manuscript BIPH-D-16-00105 "Defending the 
good cause: interpretation, meaning, and choice". 
 
I am sorry to say that based on the advice received, we have decided that your manuscript cannot be 
accepted for publication in Biology & Philosophy. 
 
Below, please find the comments for your perusal.  
 
I would like to thank you very much for forwarding your manuscript to us for consideration and wish you 
every success in finding an alternative place of publication. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Angela Potochnik 
Associate Editor 
Biology & Philosophy 
 
Comments for the Author: 
 
Reviewer #1: The author defends an understanding of 'meaning' as an 'interpretation' of information, 
which is supposed to be just the physical output of the one doing the interpreting.  On this account meaning 
is a physical thing - an act or a page with marks, etc.   
 
While the suggestion is an interesting one, it seems to lead to some strange conclusions.  For example, if 
someone gets information, it's meaning changes once they actually act on it. (i.e., if I get a message stating 'it 
is raining', the meaning is only a brain state, until I pull out my raincoat, and then the meaning is me 
pulling out the raincoat?)  The author might think about narrowing the scope of this paper to address, say, 
just this understanding of information/meaning in genes, or texts, or lives and seeing if the view can be 
made less unintuitive in one of these arenas.  If they choose to do so, it might be useful to look at and 
respond to other current positions and arguments in philosophy of science about information in these 
domains.   
 
Also, throughout the paper, there seems to be some inconsistency in the use of the terms 'interpretation' and 
'meaning'.  As described above, interpretation is supposed to be a physical output, but, for example, on 
page 7 the author writes '...is a text intended to be interpreted as 'here is easy prey' by a predator'.  How 
could this be an intended interpretation if an interpretation is a physical output?  On page 8, 'Not only do I 
see the play of light on water...These meanings are my interpretations.'  What is the physical output 
here?  If is supposed to be the brain states of the observer?  These seem to be different from 'hearing the 
clink of rigging'.   
 
 
Reviewer #2:  This lively paper concerns the way that meaning arises out of causation and selection in 
the natural world. It elaborates a view put forward by the same author in, 'Fighting the good cause: 
meaning, purpose, difference, and choice,' (Haig 2014, Biol Philos). Haig (2014) advanced a teleosemantic 
view according to which information turns into meaning when it is used by an interpreter to achieve an 
end, ends arising in the first instance as a result of evolution by natural selection. This new paper elaborates 
on what meaning is: it is the physical output of the interpreter. The author calls this 'the thing chosen' by 
the interpreter, while making clear that choice in this sense does not require reasoning or any intelligence 
on the part of the interpreter. 
 The paper does not make clear how the view differs from, or why it should be preferred to, 
existing teleosemantic accounts of meaning (e.g. Millikan 1984, Papineau 1987, Dretske 1988). The paper 
does go further than Haig (2014), but no clear argument is offered for the claim that meaning consists just 
in the physical output produced by an interpreter. Nor is it clear how misrepresentation is possible, of the 
kind the author subsequently discusses, on this view. The folded wings of a moth are intended to be 
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interpreted as *not a moth* by moth-predators. When a predator makes this interpretation - takes this 
information and uses it to inform the choice to pass on - it misrepresents (and loses out on a tasty snack). If 
meaning it just physical output, how can the meaning be *not a moth*? That is not a physical output 
produced by the moth predator. It is a condition that must be in place if the physical output produced by 
the moth predator (flying on) is to perform its evolutionary function in a normal way. 
 For the same reason, it wasn't clear how the frog's visual system could interpret 'incident photons 
on the retina as information about distance, direction of movement, and speed of the speck', if meaning 
consists just in the physical output produced by an interpreter; similarly for the claim that perceptions 
present useful information about the world (p. 6 of m/s). 
 An immediate problem faced by teleosemantic theories of meaning is to say why not all causal 
exchanges that have evolutionary functions give rise to meaning. The paper says nothing about this 
problem: whether the author embraces the liberal conclusion or has some way of avoiding it. 
 It wasn't clear what the claim that 'information is a property of relations not things' amounts to: 
whether it is different from the standard Shannon view, and if so, why that difference is important. 
Similarly, meaning is claimed to be a relation 'of things to an interpreter', not a thing in itself (p. 5 of m/s). 
How is an output produced by an interpreter a relation of a thing to an interpreter? Maybe the claim is: the 
meaning of an item of information (physical state) is a relational property of that state: it is fixed by the 
outputs purposefully produced by an interpreter in response to that state. However, that is not a novel 
claim. It is just the standard view (put forward by teleosemantic theories, amongst others). 
 Relations amongst things are treated exclusively as a matter of sameness and difference. No 
argument is given that a metaphysics of sameness and difference is adequate to capture relations of every 
kind, or that other kinds of relation should be excluded. 
 The Zimmerman telegram example suggests the opposite conclusion from the one the author 
draws. It strongly suggests that something is preserved across all the translations and changes of form of the 
telegram. They all transmit the German Empire's offer. Indeed, that is how the author presents the case (it 
'conveyed an offer from the German Empire to the Republic of Mexico', p. 11 of m/s). Having presented 
the case, the author asserts that in the chain of transmission there was constantly changing meaning, 
meaning being nothing more than the physical text produced by an interpreter (p. 12 of m/s).. That 
conclusion does indeed follow from the author's view. But what is the argument for it? That question is 
especially pressing when the author's own presentation of the case suggests the opposite conclusion. 
 The point of the section 'Large and Small' was not clear; nor the aside on causation (p. 17 of m/s). 
 The author makes a nice point, 'A speaker anticipates that a listener will interpret the public text in 
much the same way as the speaker would interpret the public text.' This insight has the potential to avoid 
many of the problems generated by Gricean pragmatics and relevance semantics (Sperber & Wilson 1986). 
This idea has recently been developed at length by Ruth Millikan (Beyond Concepts, forthcoming). 
 The account of memory is suggestive and intriguing (p. 19). The internal changes which change 
behavioural dispositions are a kind of meaning, according to the author's account, because they are a 
purposeful output. Furthermore they are also intended to be interpreted, by the self, so they act as 
information which becomes meaningful for that interpreter (which happens to be the same self). This is an 
interesting kind of private meaning. Peter Godfrey-Smith has suggested that memory should be construed 
as the sending of messages over time (Godfrey-Smith 2014 Philos Sci). The author's view develops and 
complements that idea. If the author's approach to meaning were clarified and made precise, and this claim 
about memory formulated rigorously in terms of the author's approach to meaning, that would be a 
significant contribution. 
 The paper is replete with interesting examples from biology and other sciences, and from 
literature. The examples are suggestive and could be illuminating, if properly developed. Indeed, an 
example from this manuscript has already been quoted at length by Daniel Dennett in his latest book, From 
Bacteria to Bach and Back (2016). But without being tied to clear claims and arguments, it is hard to assess 
the probative value of the author's examples. 
 There is certainly an important role in science, and no doubt especially in philosophy, for papers 
that paint a vivid picture: that put forward a position clearly, without engaging in detailed arguments for it. 
However, the position put forward in this paper is unfortunately not explained coherently enough for it to 
be interpreted that way.  
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Dear Prof. Haig: 
 
I write to you regarding manuscript # M&L-03-17-0180 entitled "Making sense: information interpreted as 
meaning" which you submitted to Mind & Language. 
 
I am sorry to say that we are not able to accept your paper for publication in Mind & Language. At the 
bottom of this letter you will find some reviewer's comments. I hope that they are helpful. Please be aware 
that the number of submissions we receive means that we are able to publish only a small fraction of what 
we receive. 
 
Thank you for considering Mind & Language for the publication of your research.I hope the outcome of 
this specific submission will not discourage you from the submission of future manuscripts. 
 
Sincerely, 
David Austin 
Editorial Office 
 
On behalf of 
The Editors of Mind & Language 
 
Reviewer(s)' Comments to Author: 
 
Reviewer: 1 
 
Comments to the Author 
Unfortunately, the paper is effectively a summary with no real attempt to advance our philosophical 
understanding of info-theoretic conceptions of meaning/communication, or to defend such the conception 
against criticisms. A paper in this area revisting the seminal work of Dretske and its influence on Fodor and 
many others might be worthwhile. But as the paper stands, I can see nothing to recommend its publication 
in a journal that has as its remit to publish novel research. 
 
Reviewer 2 
I am not sure what the point is. It is beautifully written and quite amusing, but I can¹t say I know what the 
point is supposed to be, what problem it is aiming to solve by having this conception of meaning as 
information. It has little to do with what I might call linguistic meaning (the pedestrian attempt to figure out 
how lexical terminals plus composition yield propositional meaning). It seems to be trying to argue that 
semantic meaning need not be "ghostly" (I didn't know that anyone thought it was just that we have no 
good idea of how to make it respectable). The project looks like a version of Dretske's from aeons ago, that 
some sort of causal account whereby coordinated physical events could "mean" by providing information. I 
thought that this was the standard view now (but I was a grad student a long time ago) and that the issue 
was not whether this COULD be so but how too make it do some non trivial work in more regular domains 
where meaning matters. This paper does not do this. So, I am at a loss to know what it wants to do and 
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whether it has succeeded in doing it. All I know is that it adds nothing to the kinds of problems I am 
familiar with. 
 
 
